shadow: update to 4.6

This commit is contained in:
Juergen Daubert 2018-05-04 11:15:19 +02:00
parent 8148851a3c
commit 1e09cc142b
4 changed files with 6 additions and 192 deletions

View File

@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
aad42ace9b3d450717355010b9344c56 CVE-2018-7169.patch
80756b2d5b3351b3757f48ae69fe866d login.defs
be8f69c2701118093af3d7f3bc02af16 pwck
c350da50c2120de6bb29177699d89fe3 shadow-4.5.tar.xz
b491fecbf1232632c32ff8f1437fd60e shadow-4.6.tar.xz

View File

@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/core.pub
RWRJc1FUaeVeqqLpIS3LGM3rjoF0kUdbtuIDL1UilPze46/DVrHdo27qHiHPLOaN8GLLukQJFkQRq8XV9obslWlWtguLSW/uTwo=
SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 4647cbfe01446ff33de8393e0a6d9dff1a4ac199acd417e66e6623cf6a705507
RWRJc1FUaeVeqpdbafEtEvgpRhYNzcGr9mzcyuw3nNoO7EawXtg05K/XdcDqIzBEs3WOrB5Vfcv/TmOkj/Q6uTF5sw+1FzJ9ZQQ=
SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 2a6884a5a14315e85f82c1cea46d43d5b9d61bd24f70fe64c9a4630d499ac2ed
SHA256 (.footprint) = 196891826eef19be5e249380bc5c9560b10051556be4a3be5d33e099a56f23ae
SHA256 (shadow-4.5.tar.xz) = fc8c858381ad577a5c25ff5beb6ee60a34f8719c73e4e7c61e74188b4e54b741
SHA256 (CVE-2018-7169.patch) = 3b8896d8ac400692af1e2da17b9b8a447aa668c09fe16c1b9cee55e923b64820
SHA256 (shadow-4.6.tar.xz) = 0998c8d84242a231ab0acb7f8613927ff5bcff095f8aa6b79478893a03f05583
SHA256 (pwck) = c62f1bf5785c2bb93bb269156bfa02b06728a01ff5d6c2e09cf6285701a1fda0
SHA256 (login.defs) = a5c63da222b9dd921b60a21be8fc888726b557fd3fde9f60c8899376d0311b0b

View File

@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
certain paths.
This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
the setgroups policy is already "deny".
Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
---
src/newgidmap.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644
--- a/src/newgidmap.c
+++ b/src/newgidmap.c
@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
*/
const char *Prog;
-static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
+
+static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
{
/* An empty range is invalid */
if (range->count == 0)
return false;
- /* Test /etc/subgid */
- if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
+ /* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
+ if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
+ *allow_setgroups = true;
return true;
+ }
- /* Allow a process to map its own gid */
- if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
+ /* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
+ if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
+ /* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
return true;
+ }
return false;
}
static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
- struct map_range *mappings)
+ struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
{
struct map_range *mapping;
int idx;
mapping = mappings;
for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
- if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
+ if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
Prog,
mapping->upper,
@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void)
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
+void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
+{
+ int setgroups_fd;
+ char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
+
+ /*
+ * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
+ * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
+ * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
+ * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
+ */
+ policy = "deny\n";
+ if (allow_setgroups)
+ return;
+
+ setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
+ /*
+ * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
+ * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
+ */
+ if (ENOENT == errno) {
+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
+ Prog,
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
+ * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
+ * fail.
+ */
+ if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
+ Prog,
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Write the policy. */
+ if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
+ Prog,
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
+ Prog,
+ policy,
+ strerror(errno));
+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+out:
+ close(setgroups_fd);
+}
+
/*
* newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
*/
@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw;
int written;
+ bool allow_setgroups = false;
Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
(unsigned long) getuid ()));
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
-
+
/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
if (!mappings)
usage();
- verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
+ verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
+ write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
sub_gid_close();

View File

@ -4,18 +4,14 @@
# Depends on: acl
name=shadow
version=4.5
release=2
version=4.6
release=1
source=(https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/$version/shadow-$version.tar.xz
CVE-2018-7169.patch
pwck login.defs)
build() {
cd $name-$version
# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
patch -p1 -i $SRC/CVE-2018-7169.patch
./configure --prefix=/usr \
--sysconfdir=/etc \
--disable-shared \