Merge branch '3.3' into 3.4
This commit is contained in:
Fredrik Rinnestam
commit
4e63666783
@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
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941ac82e8f62127cf1ec571e43769b3d filter
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dcc8bf183a83b362d37fe9ef8df1fb60 less-487.tar.gz
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6a39bccf420c946b0fd7ffc64961315b less-530.tar.gz
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/core.pub
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RWRJc1FUaeVeqgv2i8BKqOr3HZkL+ZT53qegqunN3P6jN/VWf6gI9n9+D7HMexSsE+uTrsV5erP/FJK8vPKR5KkM4G7NR3KpgQM=
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SHA256 (Pkgfile) = cbf6d4fde8bd66d20cf49fa10cdb8b826dee82109596fbe609211672fafada26
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RWRJc1FUaeVeqiqXHE+3blplT991WRv91byPQpjxTL5E1hLzAEgkQDq3GT0/nRhEn1Va4ZBKdGe5pqIL4cGiKDbNz5Eg8eaq9A4=
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SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 63cbfb2c7cd2199b74d9835a164e7c2e332dcac79a13241f738bc37f8c3889d1
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SHA256 (.footprint) = d91026e5d2ff4c01ff02aac7d5d2964b61bafc14f5640f5550e341af7303b79e
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SHA256 (less-487.tar.gz) = f3dc8455cb0b2b66e0c6b816c00197a71bf6d1787078adeee0bcf2aea4b12706
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SHA256 (less-530.tar.gz) = 503f91ab0af4846f34f0444ab71c4b286123f0044a4964f1ae781486c617f2e2
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SHA256 (filter) = 5d5ced375baffa004d642cf815de1c9062ee283edc7600d189aa3e146598fbd9
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
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# Depends on: ncurses libpcre
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name=less
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version=487
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version=530
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release=1
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source=(http://www.greenwoodsoftware.com/less/$name-$version.tar.gz \
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filter)
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@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
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aad42ace9b3d450717355010b9344c56 CVE-2018-7169.patch
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80756b2d5b3351b3757f48ae69fe866d login.defs
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be8f69c2701118093af3d7f3bc02af16 pwck
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c350da50c2120de6bb29177699d89fe3 shadow-4.5.tar.xz
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@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
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untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/core.pub
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RWRJc1FUaeVeqpDsCheU2Flzc0CeEsEe3NNLiW1rztqmJbdJolKG3tJmJXgvIZDG5AmhN6URgAK9BoPhy46gWxv9CRZdtZgMvwU=
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SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 28e4ab2a059acc5972ecbb882d0b08fbe36d8c6b026fc87c150df2d5f06cdc1e
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RWRJc1FUaeVeqqLpIS3LGM3rjoF0kUdbtuIDL1UilPze46/DVrHdo27qHiHPLOaN8GLLukQJFkQRq8XV9obslWlWtguLSW/uTwo=
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SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 4647cbfe01446ff33de8393e0a6d9dff1a4ac199acd417e66e6623cf6a705507
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SHA256 (.footprint) = 196891826eef19be5e249380bc5c9560b10051556be4a3be5d33e099a56f23ae
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SHA256 (shadow-4.5.tar.xz) = fc8c858381ad577a5c25ff5beb6ee60a34f8719c73e4e7c61e74188b4e54b741
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SHA256 (CVE-2018-7169.patch) = 3b8896d8ac400692af1e2da17b9b8a447aa668c09fe16c1b9cee55e923b64820
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SHA256 (pwck) = c62f1bf5785c2bb93bb269156bfa02b06728a01ff5d6c2e09cf6285701a1fda0
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SHA256 (login.defs) = a5c63da222b9dd921b60a21be8fc888726b557fd3fde9f60c8899376d0311b0b
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180
shadow/CVE-2018-7169.patch
Normal file
180
shadow/CVE-2018-7169.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
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From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
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Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
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Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
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This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
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user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
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created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
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escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
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certain paths.
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This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
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it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
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only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
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that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
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workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
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an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
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administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
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We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
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default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
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technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
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the setgroups policy is already "deny".
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Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
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Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
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Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
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---
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src/newgidmap.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
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1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
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index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644
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--- a/src/newgidmap.c
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+++ b/src/newgidmap.c
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@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
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*/
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const char *Prog;
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-static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
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+
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+static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
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{
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/* An empty range is invalid */
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if (range->count == 0)
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return false;
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- /* Test /etc/subgid */
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- if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
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+ /* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
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+ if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
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+ *allow_setgroups = true;
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return true;
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+ }
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- /* Allow a process to map its own gid */
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- if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
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+ /* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
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+ if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
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+ /* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
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return true;
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+ }
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return false;
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}
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static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
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- struct map_range *mappings)
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+ struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
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{
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struct map_range *mapping;
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int idx;
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mapping = mappings;
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for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
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- if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
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+ if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
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fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
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Prog,
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mapping->upper,
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@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void)
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exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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}
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+void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
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+{
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+ int setgroups_fd;
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+ char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
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+ * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
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+ * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
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+ * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
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+ */
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+ policy = "deny\n";
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+ if (allow_setgroups)
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+ return;
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+
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+ setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
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+ if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
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+ /*
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+ * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
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+ * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
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+ */
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+ if (ENOENT == errno) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
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+ goto out;
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+ }
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+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
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+ Prog,
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+ strerror(errno));
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+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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+ }
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+
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+ /*
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+ * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
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+ * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
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+ * fail.
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+ */
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+ if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
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+ Prog,
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+ strerror(errno));
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+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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+ }
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+ if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
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+ goto out;
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+
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+ /* Write the policy. */
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+ if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
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+ Prog,
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+ strerror(errno));
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+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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+ }
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+ if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
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+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
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+ Prog,
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+ policy,
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+ strerror(errno));
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+ exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
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+ }
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+
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+out:
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+ close(setgroups_fd);
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+}
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+
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/*
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* newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
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*/
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@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
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struct stat st;
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struct passwd *pw;
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int written;
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+ bool allow_setgroups = false;
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Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
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@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
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(unsigned long) getuid ()));
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return EXIT_FAILURE;
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}
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-
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+
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/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
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if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
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fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
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@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
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if (!mappings)
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usage();
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- verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
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+ verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
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+ write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
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write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
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sub_gid_close();
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@ -5,13 +5,17 @@
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name=shadow
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version=4.5
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release=1
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release=2
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source=(https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/$version/shadow-$version.tar.xz
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CVE-2018-7169.patch
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pwck login.defs)
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build() {
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cd $name-$version
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# https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
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patch -p1 -i $SRC/CVE-2018-7169.patch
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./configure --prefix=/usr \
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--sysconfdir=/etc \
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--disable-shared \
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