From be5eaa216f7c1a15340463725dc4591b89d2f267 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Juergen Daubert Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2013 23:33:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] [notify] glibc: security fix for CVE-2013-0242 See - http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=15078 - http://www.security-database.com/detail.php?alert=CVE-2013-0242 Note: To avoid an unclean unmount of "/" on next shutdown, reload the init process after the glibc update. Either run the included post-install script or use the following command: /sbin/telinit U --- glibc/.md5sum | 1 + glibc/Pkgfile | 6 ++- glibc/glibc-regexp_buffer_overrun.patch | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 glibc/glibc-regexp_buffer_overrun.patch diff --git a/glibc/.md5sum b/glibc/.md5sum index c827dcd9..e1889ee5 100644 --- a/glibc/.md5sum +++ b/glibc/.md5sum @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ 3402b18f924954aa68d1d59ed378545f glibc-2.16.0-multilib-dirs.patch 80b181b02ab249524ec92822c0174cf7 glibc-2.16.0.tar.xz +d4a2a19efe1e9b59b86fd15a968f7e10 glibc-regexp_buffer_overrun.patch 7e6a5a13c37f93213db9803d9790b7de glibc-resolv_assert.patch 99ed7b88221475d51a073f00d7ee9c42 glibc-segfault_in_strncasecmp.patch 8be5a4516a896a4cd589134ccf113575 glibc-strtod_integer_overflow.patch diff --git a/glibc/Pkgfile b/glibc/Pkgfile index f94fe9f9..0b8f65d4 100644 --- a/glibc/Pkgfile +++ b/glibc/Pkgfile @@ -4,14 +4,15 @@ name=glibc version=2.16.0 -release=3 +release=4 source=(http://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/glibc/glibc-$version.tar.xz \ http://crux.nu/files/distfiles/kernel-headers-3.4.11.tar.xz \ $name-$version-multilib-dirs.patch \ hosts resolv.conf nsswitch.conf host.conf ld.so.conf \ $name-resolv_assert.patch \ $name-segfault_in_strncasecmp.patch \ - $name-strtod_integer_overflow.patch) + $name-strtod_integer_overflow.patch \ + $name-regexp_buffer_overrun.patch) build() { # install kernel headers @@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ build() { patch -p1 -d $name-$version -i $SRC/$name-resolv_assert.patch patch -p1 -d $name-$version -i $SRC/$name-segfault_in_strncasecmp.patch patch -p1 -d $name-$version -i $SRC/$name-strtod_integer_overflow.patch + patch -p1 -d $name-$version -i $SRC/$name-regexp_buffer_overrun.patch patch -p1 -d $name-$version -i $SRC/$name-$version-multilib-dirs.patch mkdir build diff --git a/glibc/glibc-regexp_buffer_overrun.patch b/glibc/glibc-regexp_buffer_overrun.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000..a7869613 --- /dev/null +++ b/glibc/glibc-regexp_buffer_overrun.patch @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +# http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=15078 +# CVE-2013-0242 +# ChangeLog, NEWS and new test removed to apply clean + +commit a445af0bc722d620afed7683cd320c0e4c7c6059 +Author: Andreas Schwab +Date: Tue Jan 29 14:45:15 2013 +0100 + + Fix buffer overrun in regexp matcher + +diff --git a/posix/regexec.c b/posix/regexec.c +index 7f2de85..5ca2bf6 100644 +--- a/posix/regexec.c ++++ b/posix/regexec.c +@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int group_nodes_into_DFAstates (const re_dfa_t *dfa, + static int check_node_accept (const re_match_context_t *mctx, + const re_token_t *node, int idx) + internal_function; +-static reg_errcode_t extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx) ++static reg_errcode_t extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx, int min_len) + internal_function; + + /* Entry point for POSIX code. */ +@@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@ check_matching (re_match_context_t *mctx, int fl_longest_match, + || (BE (next_char_idx >= mctx->input.valid_len, 0) + && mctx->input.valid_len < mctx->input.len)) + { +- err = extend_buffers (mctx); ++ err = extend_buffers (mctx, next_char_idx + 1); + if (BE (err != REG_NOERROR, 0)) + { + assert (err == REG_ESPACE); +@@ -1738,7 +1738,7 @@ clean_state_log_if_needed (re_match_context_t *mctx, int next_state_log_idx) + && mctx->input.valid_len < mctx->input.len)) + { + reg_errcode_t err; +- err = extend_buffers (mctx); ++ err = extend_buffers (mctx, next_state_log_idx + 1); + if (BE (err != REG_NOERROR, 0)) + return err; + } +@@ -2792,7 +2792,7 @@ get_subexp (re_match_context_t *mctx, int bkref_node, int bkref_str_idx) + if (bkref_str_off >= mctx->input.len) + break; + +- err = extend_buffers (mctx); ++ err = extend_buffers (mctx, bkref_str_off + 1); + if (BE (err != REG_NOERROR, 0)) + return err; + +@@ -4102,7 +4102,7 @@ check_node_accept (const re_match_context_t *mctx, const re_token_t *node, + + static reg_errcode_t + internal_function __attribute_warn_unused_result__ +-extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx) ++extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx, int min_len) + { + reg_errcode_t ret; + re_string_t *pstr = &mctx->input; +@@ -4111,8 +4111,10 @@ extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx) + if (BE (INT_MAX / 2 / sizeof (re_dfastate_t *) <= pstr->bufs_len, 0)) + return REG_ESPACE; + +- /* Double the lengthes of the buffers. */ +- ret = re_string_realloc_buffers (pstr, MIN (pstr->len, pstr->bufs_len * 2)); ++ /* Double the lengthes of the buffers, but allocate at least MIN_LEN. */ ++ ret = re_string_realloc_buffers (pstr, ++ MAX (min_len, ++ MIN (pstr->len, pstr->bufs_len * 2))); + if (BE (ret != REG_NOERROR, 0)) + return ret; +