core/glibc/glibc-regexp_buffer_overrun.patch
Juergen Daubert be5eaa216f [notify] glibc: security fix for CVE-2013-0242
See
- http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=15078
- http://www.security-database.com/detail.php?alert=CVE-2013-0242

Note:
To avoid an unclean unmount of "/" on next shutdown, reload
the init process after the glibc update. Either run the
included post-install script or use the following command:

  /sbin/telinit U
2013-02-12 23:33:02 +01:00

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# http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=15078
# CVE-2013-0242
# ChangeLog, NEWS and new test removed to apply clean
commit a445af0bc722d620afed7683cd320c0e4c7c6059
Author: Andreas Schwab <schwab@suse.de>
Date: Tue Jan 29 14:45:15 2013 +0100
Fix buffer overrun in regexp matcher
diff --git a/posix/regexec.c b/posix/regexec.c
index 7f2de85..5ca2bf6 100644
--- a/posix/regexec.c
+++ b/posix/regexec.c
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int group_nodes_into_DFAstates (const re_dfa_t *dfa,
static int check_node_accept (const re_match_context_t *mctx,
const re_token_t *node, int idx)
internal_function;
-static reg_errcode_t extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx)
+static reg_errcode_t extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx, int min_len)
internal_function;
/* Entry point for POSIX code. */
@@ -1160,7 +1160,7 @@ check_matching (re_match_context_t *mctx, int fl_longest_match,
|| (BE (next_char_idx >= mctx->input.valid_len, 0)
&& mctx->input.valid_len < mctx->input.len))
{
- err = extend_buffers (mctx);
+ err = extend_buffers (mctx, next_char_idx + 1);
if (BE (err != REG_NOERROR, 0))
{
assert (err == REG_ESPACE);
@@ -1738,7 +1738,7 @@ clean_state_log_if_needed (re_match_context_t *mctx, int next_state_log_idx)
&& mctx->input.valid_len < mctx->input.len))
{
reg_errcode_t err;
- err = extend_buffers (mctx);
+ err = extend_buffers (mctx, next_state_log_idx + 1);
if (BE (err != REG_NOERROR, 0))
return err;
}
@@ -2792,7 +2792,7 @@ get_subexp (re_match_context_t *mctx, int bkref_node, int bkref_str_idx)
if (bkref_str_off >= mctx->input.len)
break;
- err = extend_buffers (mctx);
+ err = extend_buffers (mctx, bkref_str_off + 1);
if (BE (err != REG_NOERROR, 0))
return err;
@@ -4102,7 +4102,7 @@ check_node_accept (const re_match_context_t *mctx, const re_token_t *node,
static reg_errcode_t
internal_function __attribute_warn_unused_result__
-extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx)
+extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx, int min_len)
{
reg_errcode_t ret;
re_string_t *pstr = &mctx->input;
@@ -4111,8 +4111,10 @@ extend_buffers (re_match_context_t *mctx)
if (BE (INT_MAX / 2 / sizeof (re_dfastate_t *) <= pstr->bufs_len, 0))
return REG_ESPACE;
- /* Double the lengthes of the buffers. */
- ret = re_string_realloc_buffers (pstr, MIN (pstr->len, pstr->bufs_len * 2));
+ /* Double the lengthes of the buffers, but allocate at least MIN_LEN. */
+ ret = re_string_realloc_buffers (pstr,
+ MAX (min_len,
+ MIN (pstr->len, pstr->bufs_len * 2)));
if (BE (ret != REG_NOERROR, 0))
return ret;