[notify] python: patch 3 security issues: CVE-2019-20907, CVE-2020-26116, and CVE-2021-3177

This commit is contained in:
Danny Rawlins 2021-02-27 20:55:11 +11:00
parent 19326298a4
commit 2e2843fede
5 changed files with 331 additions and 4 deletions

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@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
untrusted comment: verify with /etc/ports/opt.pub
RWSE3ohX2g5d/a3K/I66yw0JReBFnr+BMNq9XxrSNdzGhoOvHro1VE9PpDKZ5W+6/jMv+GOb43/y/V28Qbhn8Bm96xWQJlj9AQs=
SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 0bdf8c849eb717a9fb4abaa0f71cf5f2d8dfa5a896740b594febf511f961681d
RWSE3ohX2g5d/SLClB71/t4Fok+TXEN5kW8zj7yJYxYSakqmWJY0a9ymGkcO7fRu33meHIdoa13OYWhUjNZS+zlEoMZChuQqIAc=
SHA256 (Pkgfile) = 4a021c82c4cfa9716295e41571af6f5aea29c8b40ec2003a65e9278833b43ef1
SHA256 (.footprint) = 45f6aea32375cc9cd313a77c570abcd08cbb4a9612d868eedf1e52d06ee062b4
SHA256 (Python-2.7.18.tar.xz) = b62c0e7937551d0cc02b8fd5cb0f544f9405bafc9a54d3808ed4594812edef43
SHA256 (pyconfig.h) = 081426cb9524c2e156a71bb035c25a67e44d389afc6f7e091bcf86a7f4e2002f
SHA256 (CVE-2019-20907.patch) = 59f8039b26f6a4613847fb4b30a1da612b4c0d5ed3c1cc92f498ebd71a734b04
SHA256 (CVE-2020-26116.patch) = 290f34ab3e6cdd99fff00ab7b1e01d3e9c4acc36ecb87b7db76207c4cdaf692a
SHA256 (CVE-2021-3177.patch) = db7835b3fa3a2897e531a219127a02bbc902e31f3363f27a456a45ddbb4eca31

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@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Rishi <rishi_devan@mail.com>
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2020 13:51:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] 00351-cve-2019-20907-fix-infinite-loop-in-tarfile.patch
00351 #
Avoid infinite loop when reading specially crafted TAR files using the tarfile module
(CVE-2019-20907).
See: https://bugs.python.org/issue39017
---
Lib/tarfile.py | 2 ++
diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py
index adf91d53823..574a6bb279d 100644
--- a/Lib/tarfile.py
+++ b/Lib/tarfile.py
@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ class TarInfo(object):
length, keyword = match.groups()
length = int(length)
+ if length == 0:
+ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header")
value = buf[match.end(2) + 1:match.start(1) + length - 1]
keyword = keyword.decode("utf8")

113
python/CVE-2020-26116.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: AMIR <31338382+amiremohamadi@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 00:46:10 +0430
Subject: [PATCH]
00354-cve-2020-26116-http-request-method-crlf-injection-in-httplib.patch
00354 #
Reject control chars in HTTP method in httplib.putrequest to prevent
HTTP header injection
Backported from Python 3.5-3.10 (and adjusted for py2's single-module httplib):
- https://bugs.python.org/issue39603
- https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/18485 (3.10)
- https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/21946 (3.5)
Co-authored-by: AMIR <31338382+amiremohamadi@users.noreply.github.com>
---
Lib/httplib.py | 16 +++++++++++++
Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
.../2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst | 2 ++
3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
diff --git a/Lib/httplib.py b/Lib/httplib.py
index fcc4152aaf2..a63677477d5 100644
--- a/Lib/httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/httplib.py
@@ -257,6 +257,10 @@ _contains_disallowed_url_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x20\x7f-\xff]')
# _is_allowed_url_pchars_re = re.compile(r"^[/!$&'()*+,;=:@%a-zA-Z0-9._~-]+$")
# We are more lenient for assumed real world compatibility purposes.
+# These characters are not allowed within HTTP method names
+# to prevent http header injection.
+_contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re = re.compile('[\x00-\x1f]')
+
# We always set the Content-Length header for these methods because some
# servers will otherwise respond with a 411
_METHODS_EXPECTING_BODY = {'PATCH', 'POST', 'PUT'}
@@ -935,6 +939,8 @@ class HTTPConnection:
else:
raise CannotSendRequest()
+ self._validate_method(method)
+
# Save the method for use later in the response phase
self._method = method
@@ -1020,6 +1026,16 @@ class HTTPConnection:
# On Python 2, request is already encoded (default)
return request
+ def _validate_method(self, method):
+ """Validate a method name for putrequest."""
+ # prevent http header injection
+ match = _contains_disallowed_method_pchar_re.search(method)
+ if match:
+ raise ValueError(
+ "method can't contain control characters. %r "
+ "(found at least %r)"
+ % (method, match.group()))
+
def _validate_path(self, url):
"""Validate a url for putrequest."""
# Prevent CVE-2019-9740.
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
index d8a57f73530..e295bb796ec 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
@@ -385,6 +385,28 @@ class HeaderTests(TestCase):
conn.putheader(name, value)
+class HttpMethodTests(TestCase):
+ def test_invalid_method_names(self):
+ methods = (
+ 'GET\r',
+ 'POST\n',
+ 'PUT\n\r',
+ 'POST\nValue',
+ 'POST\nHOST:abc',
+ 'GET\nrHost:abc\n',
+ 'POST\rRemainder:\r',
+ 'GET\rHOST:\n',
+ '\nPUT'
+ )
+
+ for method in methods:
+ with self.assertRaisesRegexp(
+ ValueError, "method can't contain control characters"):
+ conn = httplib.HTTPConnection('example.com')
+ conn.sock = FakeSocket(None)
+ conn.request(method=method, url="/")
+
+
class BasicTest(TestCase):
def test_status_lines(self):
# Test HTTP status lines
@@ -1010,6 +1032,7 @@ class TunnelTests(TestCase):
@test_support.reap_threads
def test_main(verbose=None):
test_support.run_unittest(HeaderTests, OfflineTest, BasicTest, TimeoutTest,
+ HttpMethodTests,
HTTPTest, HTTPSTest, SourceAddressTest,
TunnelTests)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..990affc3edd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2020-02-12-14-17-39.bpo-39603.Gt3RSg.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Prevent http header injection by rejecting control characters in
+http.client.putrequest(...).

179
python/CVE-2021-3177.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Viktorin <pviktori@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2021 19:29:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] 00357-CVE-2021-3177.patch
00357 #
CVE-2021-3177: Replace snprintf with Python unicode formatting in ctypes param reprs
Backport of Python3 commit 916610ef90a0d0761f08747f7b0905541f0977c7:
https://bugs.python.org/issue42938
https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/24239
---
Lib/ctypes/test/test_parameters.py | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++
Modules/_ctypes/callproc.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Lib/ctypes/test/test_parameters.py b/Lib/ctypes/test/test_parameters.py
index 23c1b6e2259..77300d71ae1 100644
--- a/Lib/ctypes/test/test_parameters.py
+++ b/Lib/ctypes/test/test_parameters.py
@@ -206,6 +206,49 @@ class SimpleTypesTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
with self.assertRaises(ZeroDivisionError):
WorseStruct().__setstate__({}, b'foo')
+ def test_parameter_repr(self):
+ from ctypes import (
+ c_bool,
+ c_char,
+ c_wchar,
+ c_byte,
+ c_ubyte,
+ c_short,
+ c_ushort,
+ c_int,
+ c_uint,
+ c_long,
+ c_ulong,
+ c_longlong,
+ c_ulonglong,
+ c_float,
+ c_double,
+ c_longdouble,
+ c_char_p,
+ c_wchar_p,
+ c_void_p,
+ )
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_bool.from_param(True)), r"^<cparam '\?' at 0x[A-Fa-f0-9]+>$")
+ self.assertEqual(repr(c_char.from_param('a')), "<cparam 'c' ('a')>")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_wchar.from_param('a')), r"^<cparam 'u' at 0x[A-Fa-f0-9]+>$")
+ self.assertEqual(repr(c_byte.from_param(98)), "<cparam 'b' (98)>")
+ self.assertEqual(repr(c_ubyte.from_param(98)), "<cparam 'B' (98)>")
+ self.assertEqual(repr(c_short.from_param(511)), "<cparam 'h' (511)>")
+ self.assertEqual(repr(c_ushort.from_param(511)), "<cparam 'H' (511)>")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_int.from_param(20000)), r"^<cparam '[li]' \(20000\)>$")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_uint.from_param(20000)), r"^<cparam '[LI]' \(20000\)>$")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_long.from_param(20000)), r"^<cparam '[li]' \(20000\)>$")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_ulong.from_param(20000)), r"^<cparam '[LI]' \(20000\)>$")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_longlong.from_param(20000)), r"^<cparam '[liq]' \(20000\)>$")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_ulonglong.from_param(20000)), r"^<cparam '[LIQ]' \(20000\)>$")
+ self.assertEqual(repr(c_float.from_param(1.5)), "<cparam 'f' (1.5)>")
+ self.assertEqual(repr(c_double.from_param(1.5)), "<cparam 'd' (1.5)>")
+ self.assertEqual(repr(c_double.from_param(1e300)), "<cparam 'd' (1e+300)>")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_longdouble.from_param(1.5)), r"^<cparam ('d' \(1.5\)|'g' at 0x[A-Fa-f0-9]+)>$")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_char_p.from_param(b'hihi')), "^<cparam 'z' \(0x[A-Fa-f0-9]+\)>$")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_wchar_p.from_param('hihi')), "^<cparam 'Z' \(0x[A-Fa-f0-9]+\)>$")
+ self.assertRegexpMatches(repr(c_void_p.from_param(0x12)), r"^<cparam 'P' \(0x0*12\)>$")
+
################################################################
if __name__ == '__main__':
diff --git a/Modules/_ctypes/callproc.c b/Modules/_ctypes/callproc.c
index 066fefc0cca..5cc3c4cf685 100644
--- a/Modules/_ctypes/callproc.c
+++ b/Modules/_ctypes/callproc.c
@@ -460,50 +460,62 @@ PyCArg_dealloc(PyCArgObject *self)
static PyObject *
PyCArg_repr(PyCArgObject *self)
{
- char buffer[256];
switch(self->tag) {
case 'b':
case 'B':
- sprintf(buffer, "<cparam '%c' (%d)>",
+ return PyString_FromFormat("<cparam '%c' (%d)>",
self->tag, self->value.b);
- break;
case 'h':
case 'H':
- sprintf(buffer, "<cparam '%c' (%d)>",
+ return PyString_FromFormat("<cparam '%c' (%d)>",
self->tag, self->value.h);
- break;
case 'i':
case 'I':
- sprintf(buffer, "<cparam '%c' (%d)>",
+ return PyString_FromFormat("<cparam '%c' (%d)>",
self->tag, self->value.i);
- break;
case 'l':
case 'L':
- sprintf(buffer, "<cparam '%c' (%ld)>",
+ return PyString_FromFormat("<cparam '%c' (%ld)>",
self->tag, self->value.l);
- break;
#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG
case 'q':
case 'Q':
- sprintf(buffer,
- "<cparam '%c' (%" PY_FORMAT_LONG_LONG "d)>",
+ return PyString_FromFormat("<cparam '%c' (%lld)>",
self->tag, self->value.q);
- break;
#endif
case 'd':
- sprintf(buffer, "<cparam '%c' (%f)>",
- self->tag, self->value.d);
- break;
- case 'f':
- sprintf(buffer, "<cparam '%c' (%f)>",
- self->tag, self->value.f);
- break;
-
+ case 'f': {
+ PyObject *s = PyString_FromFormat("<cparam '%c' (", self->tag);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ PyObject *f = PyFloat_FromDouble((self->tag == 'f') ? self->value.f : self->value.d);
+ if (f == NULL) {
+ Py_DECREF(s);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ PyObject *r = PyObject_Repr(f);
+ Py_DECREF(f);
+ if (r == NULL) {
+ Py_DECREF(s);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ PyString_ConcatAndDel(&s, r);
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ r = PyString_FromString(")>");
+ if (r == NULL) {
+ Py_DECREF(s);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ PyString_ConcatAndDel(&s, r);
+ return s;
+ }
case 'c':
- sprintf(buffer, "<cparam '%c' (%c)>",
+ return PyString_FromFormat("<cparam '%c' ('%c')>",
self->tag, self->value.c);
- break;
/* Hm, are these 'z' and 'Z' codes useful at all?
Shouldn't they be replaced by the functionality of c_string
@@ -512,16 +524,13 @@ PyCArg_repr(PyCArgObject *self)
case 'z':
case 'Z':
case 'P':
- sprintf(buffer, "<cparam '%c' (%p)>",
+ return PyUnicode_FromFormat("<cparam '%c' (%p)>",
self->tag, self->value.p);
- break;
default:
- sprintf(buffer, "<cparam '%c' at %p>",
- self->tag, self);
- break;
+ return PyString_FromFormat("<cparam '%c' at %p>",
+ (unsigned char)self->tag, (void *)self);
}
- return PyString_FromString(buffer);
}
static PyMemberDef PyCArgType_members[] = {

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@ -5,13 +5,20 @@
name=python
version=2.7.18
release=2
release=3
source=(https://www.python.org/ftp/$name/${version::6}/Python-$version.tar.xz \
pyconfig.h)
pyconfig.h \
CVE-2019-20907.patch \
CVE-2020-26116.patch \
CVE-2021-3177.patch)
build () {
cd Python-$version
patch -p1 -i $SRC/CVE-2019-20907.patch
patch -p1 -i $SRC/CVE-2020-26116.patch
patch -p1 -i $SRC/CVE-2021-3177.patch
# remove 2to3, we use the one from python3
rm -r Lib/lib2to3